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Note
HOPWOOD v. TEXAS: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT FURTHER LIMITS
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITIES
The U.S. Supreme Court recently denied certiorari on a highly
controversial affirmative action decision handed down by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals.' In Hopwood v. Texas,' the Fifth Circuit held
that an affirmative action admissions program at the University of
Texas School of Law violated the individual lights of nonminority ap-
plicants under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.8 The court reached this conclusion by rejecting the goal of
achieving a diverse student body as a compelling government interest
sufficient to justify classification of applicants on the basis of race.4 In
addition, the court limited a state professional school's ability to im-
plement a remedial affirmative action program to those situations in
which the school can show the existence of present effects of its own
past discrimination.5 In so holding, the Fifth Circuit extended
Supreme Court precedent and placed severe limitations upon affirma-
tive action initiatives of state institutions of higher learning.
I. THE CASE
Cheryl Hopwood, Douglas Carvell, Kenneth Elliott, and David
Rogers were each denied a highly coveted place in the 1992 entering
class of the University of Texas School of Law.6 These four Caucasian
applicants brought a constitutional challenge to the law school's af-
firmative action admissions program, contending that the school's
preferential consideration of African-American and Mexican-Ameri-
can applicants violated their right to "the equal protection of the laws"
1. Texas v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2581, denying cert. to 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
2. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
3. Id. at 962.
4. Id. at 948.
5. Id. at 953-54.
6. Id. at 938. The University of Texas School of Law is consistently ranked among the
top law schools in the United States. Id. at 935 (citing America's Best Graduate Schools, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 20, 1995, at 84). The school also receives over 4000 applications
every year from prospective candidates competing for only 500 places in each entering
class. Id.
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guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
7
The federal district court found that the law school operated a
different admissions process for African-American and Mexican-Amer-
ican applicants than for all other applicants.8 The dual admissions
processes differed in two significant ways.9 First, the law school used
different Texas Index (TI)'o ranges to assign prospective minority and
nonminority students to one of three categories-"presumptive ad-
mission," "presumptive denial," or a "discretionary" admission cate-
gory." The law school adjusted its TI ranges during the admissions
process each year to achieve a "goal" of ten percent Mexican-Ameri-
can and five percent African-American students in each entering
class. 12
Second, the district court found race-based differences in the
manner in which the law school reviewed "discretionary zone" appli-
cants. 3 The school divided application files for most persons as-
7. Id. at 938. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "No State
shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 561-62 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd and remanded
in part, and appeal dismissed in part, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581
(1996).
9. Id. at 561.
10. The Texas Index (TI) is a composite of an applicant's undergraduate grade point
average and Law School Admission Test score. Id. The university used an applicant's TI as
a rough predictor of success in law school and ranked applicants according to their TIs. Id.
11. Id. In March 1992, the law school required African-American and Mexican-Ameri-
can applicants to possess a TI score of 189 in order to be assigned to a "presumptive admis-
sion" category, which virtually assured the candidate an offer of admission. Hopwood, 78
F.3d at 936. In contrast, the school required all applicants who did not identify themselves
as either African American or Mexican American to possess a TI of 199 in order to be
assigned to the presumptive admission category. Id. At the other end of the TI contin-
uum, a score of 192 or less resulted in automatic denial of admission for most nonminority
applicants, while members of the preferred minority groups enjoyed a cut-off score of 179.
Id. Thus, a score between 189 and 192 would place most nonminority applicants in the
.presumptive denial" category, but would likely result in automatic admission offers for
members of a preferred minority group. Id. at 937. The law school placed applicants
whose TI scores fell between the presumptive admission and denial cutoffs in a middle
category or "discretionary zone." Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 558.
12. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 937 & n.10. The law school established these goals in the early
1980s as part of a plan submitted by the State of Texas to correct deficiencies in minority
representation in state graduate and professional schools, and to eliminate vestiges of de
jure discrimination against African Americans as identified in an investigation by the U.S.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) Office for Civil Rights (OCR). Hop-
wood, 861 F. Supp. at 555-56. The 10% and 5% goals were proportionate to the pool of
Mexican-American and African-American graduates from undergraduate state institutions.
Id. at 556 & n.6.
13. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 562.
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signed to the discretionary zone, including those of the plaintiffs,14
into groups of thirty, and each member of a three-person admissions
subcommittee reviewed them without discussion. 15 For every group of
thirty files, each subcommittee member could cast nine affirmative
votes for admission.16 A separate minority subcommittee, however, re-
viewed the African-American and Mexican-American applications.17
Unlike the procedure employed for most students in the discretionary
range, the minority subcommittee individually reviewed and discussed
each African-American and Mexican-American application. This
subcommittee recommended minority applicants for admission to the
full admissions committee, and the school treated the recommenda-
tions as "virtually final." 9 Thus, the law school did not directly com-
pare the qualifications of African-American and Mexican-American
students in the discretionary zone with those of other discretionary
zone applicants at any time during the admissions process.2 °
The district court applied a strict scrutiny standard of constitu-
tional review to the state's preferential treatment of applicants on the
basis of race.21 In applying this standard, the court asked if the racial
classification served "'a compelling governmental interest'" and
whether the race-based process was "'narrowly tailored"' to further
that interest.22 The court held that two of the law school's justifica-
tions for the race-based admissions process constituted compelling
government interests.2 ' Relying upon Justice Powell's opinion in Re-
gents of the University of Calfornia v. Bakke,24 the district court deter-
mined that the law school's goal of "seeking the educational benefits
14. Elliott, Carvell, and Rogers each had a TI of 197. Id. at 565-67. The chair of the
admissions committee shifted Hopwood, whose TI was 199, from the presumptive admis-
sion to the discretionary category on the basis of perceived weaknesses in her academic
background, including attendance at less competitive undergraduate institutions. Id. at
564 & n.41.
15. Id. at 562.
16. Id. Applicants who received no votes were automatically denied admission, those
who received two or three votes were offered admission, and those who received one vote
were wait-listed. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 563.
20. Id. at 575-76.
21. Id. at 568 ("Affirmative action plans based on race trigger strict judicial scrutiny."
(citing City of Richmond v.JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion))).
22. Id. at 569 (citing Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (plural-
ity opinion)).
23. Id. at 570.
24. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court and
reasoned that selection of students "who will contribute the most to the 'robust exchange
of ideas' . . . [is a goal] of paramount importance." Id. at 313.
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that flow from having a diverse student body" served as a compelling
state interest for the purpose of an equal protection analysis.2 5 Like-
wise, the court also found the State's interest in "redressing the de-
cades of educational discrimination to which African Americans and
Mexican Americans have been subjected in the public school systems
of the State of Texas" sufficiently compelling. 6 Significantly, the
court placed no constitutional limitations on the school's use of reme-
dial racial classifications to rectify discriminatory practices by the
State's educational system as a whole. Reasoning that "[t]he State's
institutions of higher education are inextricably linked to the primary
and secondary schools in the system," the district court held that the
University of Texas School of Law had a compelling interest in ad-
dressing "the present effects . . .of past discriminatory practices"
throughout the State's public school system. 7
Despite its identification of two compelling state interests, the dis-
trict court determined that the school's admissions program did not
satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement of the strict scrutiny stan-
dard.2 ' The court reasoned that although affording a minority appli-
cant a racial preference, or "'plus' factor, "29 would be constitutionally
permissible, the failure of the law school's admissions process to "af-
ford each individual applicant a comparison with the entire pool of
applicants" unnecessarily and impermissibly offended equal protec-
tion rights under the Fourteenth Amendment."°
The district court awarded the plaintiffs declaratory relief, al-
lowing them to reapply to the law school without incurring additional
cost.31 The court, however, declined to grant an injunction that
would have ordered the school to admit the plaintiffs, finding that the
plaintiffs had failed to show that they would have been admitted but
for the race-based procedures.32 The court also found it unnecessary
to order prospective injunctive relief because the law school had sub-
sequently adopted a new admissions procedure that eliminated the
separate minority subcommittee. 3 Finally, the district court limited
25. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 570.
26. Id. (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987)).
27. Id. at 571, 573.
28. Id. at 579.
29. Id. at 578 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.)).
30. Id. at 579.
31. Id. at 582-83.
32. Id. at 582.
33. Id.
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compensatory damages to the nominal amount of one dollar.3 4 The
plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit."5
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
For over two decades, the Supreme Court has repeatedly ad-
dressed the constitutionality of racial classifications that favor minori-
ties. In 1974, in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 6 the Court faced a factual
scenario closely analogous to that in Hopwood.s 7 In that case, however,
the Court declined to consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause prohibited a state law school from using ad-
missions procedures that gave preferential treatment to racial and eth-
nic minorities because that issue was moot."8
Four years later, the Court first addressed the constitutionality of
preferential admissions standards for minorities in Regents of the Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke. 9 In Bakke, a plurality of Justices struck
down the admissions policy of the University of California at Davis
Medical School because it used a quota system to enroll minority ap-
34. Id. at 583.
35. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 932.
36. 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam).
37. In DeFunis, the plaintiff brought suit against various officers, faculty, and members
of the Board of Regents of the University of Washington, contending that his denial of
admission to the University of Washington Law School was the result of invidious racial
discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Id. at
314. The challenged affirmative action admissions program involved a process whereby a
separate admissions subcommittee reviewed the applications of select ethnic minority
group members and never directly compared these applications with those of nonminority
applicants. Id. at 323 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In addition, the school gave less weight to
an index calculated on the basis of an applicant's Law School Admission Test score and
college grades when reviewing minority applications. Id. at 321, 324.
38. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 319-20. The plaintiff was guaranteed completion of his final
term at law school by the time his case came before the Court. Id.
Dissenting, Justice Douglas opined that the only constitutionally permissible preferen-
tial admission process would be one that involved decisions based on a comparison of the
individual attributes of all applicants, rather than solely on the basis of race. Id. at 332
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Perhaps anticipating the Court's 20-year struggle to distinguish
between "benign" and "invidious" racial discrimination, Justice Douglas noted that the
University of Washington Law School's race-based admissions policy "'certainly [was] not
benign with respect to nonminority students who are displaced by it.'" Id. at 333 (quoting
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d. 1169, 1182 (1973)). He contended that "any state-spon-
sored preference to one race over another... is... 'invidious' and violative of the Equal
Protection Clause." Id. at 344.
In a separate dissent, in which Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall concurred, Jus-
tice Brennan found "no justification for the Court's straining to rid itself of [the equal
protection] dispute" and concluded that the Court "disserve[d] the public interest" by
avoiding the constitutional issue. Id. at 349-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. 438 U.S. 265 (1987).
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plicants. ° In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist, concluded that the federally funded
medical school's admissions program violated Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 19644' because it excluded Bakke on the basis of race.4 2
Therefore, these four Justices declined to reach the federal constitu-
tional issue.4" Also writing separately, Justices Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun concluded that the medical school's affirmative
action admissions program was constitutionally permissible.' The
Brennan camp reasoned that "[g]overnment may take race into ac-
count when it acts not to demean or insult any racial group, but to
remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice
"945
In an opinion that no other Justice joined, Justice Powell cast the
decisive vote in Bakke that struck down the school's affirmative action
program.46 Justice Powell rejected the university's argument that the
appropriate level ofjudicial scrutiny for a racial classification depends
on whether the burdened race is a "discrete and insular minority."47
He asserted that the "'rights established [by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment] are personal rights"'48 and concluded that "[t]he guarantee of
equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individ-
ual and something else when applied to a person of another color."49
40. Id. at 320 (opinion of Powell, J.). The admissions program at issue reserved 16 of
the 100 places in the medical school's entering class for members of minority groups,
which included African Americans, Chicanos, Asians, and Native American Indians. Id. at
274-75. Allan Bakke, a white male applicant who was denied admission, claimed that the
existence of "special admissions slots" for minority students operated as a "racial and eth-
nic quota." Id. at 276. He challenged the school's admissions program under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as under California's Constitu-
tion, and section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 278.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
42. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 412 (StevensJ, concurring in the judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part).
43. Id. at 411-12.
44. Id. at 379 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). These fourJustices concluded that remedial
race-based classifications "'must serve important governmental objectives and must be sub-
stantially related to achievement of those objectives.'" Id. at 359 (citing Califano v. Web-
ster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
45. Id. at 325.
46. Id. at 320 (opinion of Powell, J.).
47. Id. at 287-88 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938)).
48. Id. at 288 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)) (alteration in
original).
49. Id. at 289-90.
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Applying a heightened level of judicial scrutiny,5" Justice Powell con-
cluded that achievement of a diverse student body clearly served "a
constitutionally permissible goal."" In support of this conclusion, he
invoked the First Amendment,52 suggesting that it affords state univer-
sities "the right to select those students who will contribute the most
to the 'robust exchange of ideas."'5 3 Despite identifying this legiti-
mate and substantial goal, Justice Powell concluded that the school
had failed to narrowly tailor its admissions program so as to permit it
to pass constitutional muster. 4 He declared that, while the school
could consider race a "plus" factor indicative of one element of diver-
sity, it could not "insulate the individual from comparison with all
other candidates for the available seats."55 Justice Powell determined
that insofar as the medical school's admissions program used race as
an exclusive indicator of diversity, it unnecessarily violated the consti-
tutional rights of individual applicants.56
The Court next addressed the constitutionality of a race-based af-
firmative action program in the context of a Fifth Amendment equal
protection challenge to the federal Public Works Employment Act in
Fullilove v. Klutznick.57 A plurality of Justices upheld a provision in the
Act that awarded at least ten percent of all federal funding for local
public works projects to minority-owned businesses.58 In an opinion
joined only by Justices White and Powell, Chief Justice Burger noted
that "[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must neces-
sarily receive a most searching examination to make sure it does not
conflict with constitutional guarantees. "5  Chief Justice Burger ex-
pressly declined to adopt the equal protection analysis articulated in
any of the separate Bakke opinions.' Instead, he applied a two-part
50. Id. at 305-07.
51. Id. at 311-12.
52. U.S. CONSTr. amend. I. The Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ... or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble . . . ." Id.
53. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13 (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting United States v. Associ-
ated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)). But see Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,
943 n.25 ("Saying that a university has a First Amendment interest in this context is some-
what troubling. Both the medical school in Bakke and, in our case, the law school are state
institutions. The First Amendment generally protects citizens from the actions of govern-
ment, not government from its citizens.").
54. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (opinion of Powell, J.).
55. Id. at 317.
56. Id. at 317-20.
57. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
58. Id. at 492 (opinion of Burger, CJ.).
59. Id. at 491.
60. Id. at 492.
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test that required the Court to determine whether the objectives of
the Act were within Congress's power and whether the racial and eth-
nic classification was a constitutionally permissible means for achiev-
ing those objectives.61
Six years later, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,6 2 a plurality
of the Court held that the race-based preferences contained in a
teacher layoff plan violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee
of equal protection.6" Applying a strict scrutiny standard, the plurality
recognized remediation of prior discrimination against minorities as a
compelling government interest.' However, the Court held that a
public employer must ensure that "convincing evidence that remedial
action is warranted" exists before implementing an affirmative action
program.65 The plurality held that the school board's layoff plan was
"not sufficiently narrowly tailored" to accomplish its purported reme-
dial purpose because "[o]ther less intrusive means of accomplishing
similar purposes ... [were] available."66
In City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,67 the Court reaffirmed the
application of strict scrutiny for all race-based classifications imposed
by state or local actors.' A majority of the Justices agreed that race-
based affirmative action plans demand strict judicial scrutiny, regard-
less of "the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classifi-
cation. " " In support of consistent application of the strict scrutiny
61. Id. at 473.
62. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion).
63. Id. at 284 (opinion of Powell, J.).
64. Id. at 277.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 283-84.
67. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion). In Croson, the Court considered a Four-
teenth Amendment equal protection challenge to a program that required prime contrac-
tors who were awarded city construction contracts to subcontract 30% of their contracts to
minority-owned business. Id. at 477. Relying largely upon the Supreme Court's decision in
Fullilove, in which the Court found a similar federal set-aside program constitutional, see
supra note 58 and accompanying text, a federal district court and the Fourth Circuit ini-
tially upheld the Richmond plan. Croson, 488 U.S. at 483-84. The Supreme Court re-
manded the case for the Fourth Circuit to consider it in light of the Court's intervening
decision in Wygant. Id. at 485; see supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text. On remand,
the Fourth Circuit applied the strict scrutiny standard articulated in Wygant and struck
down the plan. Croson, 488 U.S. at 483-84. The Supreme Court again granted certiorari
upon the city's appeal. Id. at 486.
68. Id. at 494 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
69. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy joined Justice
O'Connor. Justice Scalia wrote a separate, concurring opinion, agreeing with the conclu-
sion that all racial classifications by government actors must be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny, but disagreeing with Justice O'Connor's suggestion that, in some remedial con-
texts, governmental classifications by race may be constitutionally permissible. Id. at 520
(opinion of ScaliaJ., concurring in the judgment).
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standard, Justice O'Connor reasoned, "Absent searching judicial in-
quiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there is sim-
ply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or
'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate
notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics." 7 With respect to
Richmond's argument that past discrimination justified the city's plan
as a remedial measure, the plurality determined that the City lacked
"'a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was
necessary."'71 The plurality reasoned that, for the plan to serve a gen-
uinely remedial purpose, the City must establish a history of discrimi-
nation against the preferred minority groups in the Richmond
construction industry, and that a general claim of past discrimination
in the construction industry at large would not suffice.7 2
One year after striking down Richmond's minority set-aside pro-
gram in Croson, the Court held, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,73
that the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC's) policies favor-
ing minority ownership and management of radio and television
broadcast stations did not offend the equal protection component of
the Fifth Amendment." Applying an intermediate standard of judi-
cial scrutiny to what it called a "benign" racial classification by the
federal government, the Court held that the FCC's goal of
"promot[ing] programming diversity" was an "important" government
objective and that the agency's policies were "substantially related" to
the achievement of that objective.75
Most recently, however, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,76 the
Court expressly overruled Metro Broadcastin's application of interme-
diate scrutiny to federal affirmative action programs. 77 The Court ar-
ticulated three constitutional principles regarding governmental race-
70. Id. at 493 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
71. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 (quoting Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277
(1986) (plurality opinion)).
72. Id. at 498-501. The Court explained, "Like the claim that discrimination in primary
and secondary schools justifies a rigid racial preference in medical school admission, an
amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in a particular industry cannot
justify the use of an unyielding racial quota." Id. at 499.
73. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
74. Id. at 566. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, "No person shall...
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
V.
75. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 566. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan empha-
sized that, in determining the appropriate level ofjudicial scrutiny to be brought to bear
on this federal race-based program, it was "of overriding significance" that the program
had been specifically mandated by Congress. Id. at 563.
76. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
77. Id. at 2113.
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based classifications. 7 First, the Court held that any governmental
racial classification must be viewed with skepticism 79 and "must be an-
alyzed . . . under strict scrutiny."8° Racial classifications, the Court
held, "are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures
that further compelling governmental interests.""' Second, the Court
announced the principle of consistency, citing Croson for the proposi-
tion that "'the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause
is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a
particular classification."'82 Finally, the Court emphasized the re-
quirement of congruence, which means that the standard of review
must be the same in an equal protection analysis of racial classifica-
tions whether analyzing the actions of the federal government under
the Fifth Amendment or of state and local governments under the
Fourteenth Amendment." The Court declined to reach the question
of whether the challenged federal practice of providing general con-
tractors an incentive to hire socially and economically disadvantaged
subcontractors, with race-based presumptions in identifying disadvan-
taged individuals, satisfied its principles for constitutionality.8 4 In-
stead, the Court remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit to make that
determination. 5
III. SUMMARY OF THE COURT'S REASONING
In Hopwood v. Texas, the Fifth Circuit held that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the University of Texas School of Law from dis-
criminating in favor of Mexican Americans and African Americans by
affording them preferential consideration in the admissions process.86
The court began its analysis by establishing that all racial classifica-
tions by state actors are highly suspect under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 7 Applying the strict scrutiny analysis articulated in Adarand,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that a constitutionally permissible race-
78. Id. at 2111.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2113.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2111 (quoting City of Richmond v.J. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989)
(plurality opinion)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2118.
85. Id.
86. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 934.
87. Id. at 940. The Court invoked Adarand, Croson, and Wygant and concluded that
"there is now absolutely no doubt" that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard ofjudi-
cial review for all racial classifications, regardless of whether the burdened race is a "'group
that historically has not been subject to government discrimination.'" Id. & n.17.
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based classification must "serve a compelling government interest"
and be "narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal.""8
Unlike the district court below, the court of appeals found no
compelling justification to satisfy the first prong of the strict scrutiny
test.8 9 The Fifth Circuit rejected the notion that the goal of achieving
student body diversity satisfied strict scrutiny standards.9 ° The court
declined to recognize Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke as controlling
precedent on the issue, noting that Powell's view on the diversity justi-
fication had not represented the view of the majority of the Court.9"
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit invoked the plurality opinion in Croson for
the proposition that "'[u]nless [racial classifications] are strictly re-
served for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of ra-
cial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility. "'92
The Fifth Circuit also disagreed with the district court's recogni-
tion of a compelling state interest in remedying present effects of past
discrimination.9" The Court of Appeals determined that the law
school failed to show a relationship between its race-based admissions
program and present harm caused by past discriminatory practices by
the Texas public school system.9" Recognizing the underrepresenta-
tion of minorities in the student body as the law school's most persua-
sive evidence of present effects of past discrimination, the court
concluded that the school could justify remedial racial classifications
only if the present harm resulted from past discriminatory practices by
the law school itself, rather than other "units" within the Texas public
88. Id. at 940 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2111, 2117
(1995)).
89. Id. at 948, 955.
90. Id. at 948.
91. Id. at 944. Additionally, the Fifth Circuit observed: "No [Supreme Court] case
since Bakke has accepted diversity as a compelling state interest under a strict scrutiny anal-
ysis." Id.
92. Id. at 944-45 (quoting City of Richmond v. JA Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(plurality opinion)) (alteration in original).
93. Id. at 950.
94. Id. at 955. The court rejected the university's arguments that present effects of past
discriminatory state practices included the law school's reputation in the minority commu-
nity as a "white" school and the perception that the law school presented a "hostile envi-
ronment" to minorities. Id. at 952-53. Reasoning that the first justification resulted from
simple knowledge of historical fact and the second from general societal discrimination,
the Fifth Circuit dismissed these claims as analogous to those rejected by the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Podberesky v. Kirwan in 1994. Id. (citing Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. CL 2001 (1995)).
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school system.9 5 The court found the record devoid of evidence of
official racial discrimination by the law school itself.96
IV. ANALYSIS
In Hopwood v. Texas, the Fifth Circuit held that neither the goal of
achieving a diverse student body nor the objective of remedying past
dejure discrimination by the state's public school system constitutes a
compelling government interest sufficient to satisfy strict judicial scru-
tiny in an equal protection challenge to a race-based law school admis-
sion system.9" In doing so, the Fifth Circuit extended Supreme Court
precedent and drove "a stake through the heart of affirmative ac-
tion "" in state institutions of higher learning.
A. Diversity as a Compelling Government Interest
Although the Fifth Circuit's elimination of diversity as a compel-
ling justification for affirmative action programs is perhaps a logical
and inevitable extension of Supreme Court jurisprudence, it is an ex-
tension nonetheless.99 The court justified its departure from Bakke by
noting that the diversity rationale for race-based admissions programs
advanced in Justice Powell's opinion had not garnered support by a
majority of the Court and that the Court has not accepted diversity as
a compelling state interest under strict scrutiny since Justice Powell's
1978 opinion. 00 However, the Supreme Court has not expressly over-
ruled Bakke,1" 1 and, as Judge Wiener noted in his special concurrence
to the Fifth Circuit's opinion, "[I]f Bakke is to be declared dead, the
Supreme Court ... should make that pronouncement. "102
The first strike against diversity as a justification for affirmative
action in the educational context comes from its "murky" incep-
tion. 03 Justice Powell suggested that "race or ethnic background may
95. Id. at 953-54. The court cited Croson's holding that the proper scope of permissible
remedial interest in that case was limited to the Richmond construction industry, rather
than the construction industry as a whole. Id. at 954; see supra note 72 and accompanying
text.
96. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 954.
97. Id. at 962.
98. Id. at 965 n.19 (Wiener, J., specially concurring).
99. Id. at 963.
100. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
101. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 570-71.
102. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 963 (Wiener, J., specially concurring).
103. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Reme-
dies, 67 CAL. L. REv. 3, 17-18 (1979) (describing Bakke's "murky constitutional require-
ments" and suggesting that school officials developing affirmative action admissions
programs will experience difficulty complying with them).
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be deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file," but may not "insu-
late the individual from comparison with all other candidates.""°4 He
did not define what a "plus" factor is, nor did he indicate how much
weight that factor should be afforded in the admissions process.10
Justice Powell described a model admissions program as "flexible
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the
particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the
same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according
them the same weight." °6 However, this "flexibility" readily gives way
to "vagueness,"10 7 and affirmative action admissions programs leave
themselves wide open to charges of constitutional infirmity.
The second strike against diversity as a compelling governmental
objective goes to the heart of the constitutional guarantee of "equal
protection of the laws."10 The Fourteenth Amendment provides
equal protection to "any person," not "any group."1"9 Racial classifica-
tions designed for the purpose of promoting student body diversity
use race as a "proxy" for individual characteristics, such as a back-
ground of poverty or urban life, direct experience with prejudice, or
triumph over adversity, which may be directly relevant to the promo-
tion of a "robust exchange of ideas."" 0 In doing so, the governmental
actor makes assumptions about the qualities of individuals based upon
their ethnic background or the color of their skin."' It is precisely
these types of generalizations-those based upon "irrelevant" consid-
erations such as race-against which the Fourteenth Amendment
protects."12
104. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978) (opinion of Powell,
J.).
105. In fact,Justice Powell indicated that the weight assigned to each.indicia of diversity
.may vary from year to year depending upon the 'mix' both of the student body and the
applicants for the incoming class." Id. at 317-18.
106. Id. at 317.
107. Bell, supra note 103, at 19.
108. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
109. See id.
110. Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment
of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. Or. REv. 1, 8-9.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 10. Posner defines "to be prejudiced" as follows:
ascrib[ing] to the members of a group defined by a racial or similarly arbitrary
characteristic attributes typically or frequently possessed by members of the group
without pausing to consider whether the individual member in question has that
characteristic-sometimes without being willing even to consider evidence that
he does not.
Id. (foomote omitted); see also Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990)
(O'Connor,J., dissenting) ("Social scientists may debate how peoples' thoughts and behav-
ior reflect their background, but the Constitution provides that the Government may not
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The final blow against the use of diversity as a compelling justifi-
cation for racial classifications is one that the Fifth Circuit did not
reach, but one that, absent clear Supreme Court guidance, will likely
result in the diversity objective's demise. Given the use of race and
ethnicity as a surrogate for individual characteristics relevant to the
objective of a diverse educational environment, affirmative action pro-
grams that purport to advance the diversity objective will almost surely
fail to satisfy the "onerous 'narrowly tailored' requirement"'1 13 of strict
scrutiny. Even if diversity in higher education is accepted as a compel-
ling government objective, the vast array of individual characteristics
and racial and ethnic backgrounds that could be used as surrogates
for those characteristics virtually assures that race-based affirmative ac-
tion programs justified by diversity will be underinclusive "4
B. Remedial Goals of Affirmative Action as a Compelling
Government Interest
By limiting the constitutional permissibility of remedial affirma-
tive action programs in state institutions of higher learning to situa-
tions in which the ameliorator of present effects of past discrimination
is also the perpetrator of that discrimination,113 the Fifth Circuit has
strained the bounds of reason and prevailing precedent. The Fifth
Circuit relied primarily on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Wygant
and Croson when it identified the University of Texas School of Law as
the relevant "governmental unit" that must show a history of prior
allocate benefits and burdens among individuals based on the assumption that race or
ethnicity determines how they act or think.").
113. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 294 (1986) (opinion of O'Connor,
J.).
114. Giving birth to the diversity justification, Justice Powell stated:
[T]he United States ha[s] become a Nation of minorities. Each had to struggle-
and to some extent struggles still-to overcome the prejudices not of a mono-
lithic majority, but of a "majority" composed of various minority groups of whom
it was said-perhaps unfairly in many cases-that a shared characteristic was a
willingness to disadvantage other groups.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 292 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)
(footnotes omitted). But see Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47
STAN. L. REv. 855, 872 (1995) ("It is the disadvantaged or subordinated status of the mem-
bers of [certain minority] groups ... that makes their presence especially relevant to the
school's educational mission and that also requires affirmative action to ensure their pres-
ence."). These commentators argue that, "[ifn deciding whom to include in an affirmative
action program, a law school might appropriately consider the salience of the group in
contemporary American society or in the geographic region in which its graduates tend to
practice." Id. at 873. Brest and Oshige suggest that determinants of a group's "salience"
might include "its numerical size and the extent to which its culture differs from the domi-
nant culture of students attending the school." Id.
115. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948-52.
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discrimination before it can fashion a race-based remedy." 6 By apply-
ing the Court's reasoning in government employment contract situa-
tions to the facts in Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit ignored characteristics
unique to the educational context.
The influence of one government actor's discriminatory practices
upon a burdened group member's ability to share fully in the benefits
offered by another government actor is perhaps nowhere more di-
rectly apparent than in public education. As the district court as-
serted in Hopwood, "The State's institutions of higher education are
inextricably linked to the primary and secondary schools in the sys-
tem."11 7 State-run educational systems are multi-tiered systems in
which, by and large, success at one level, or even arrival at that level, is
dependent upon success at a prior level. When an individual applies
for admission to a state university or professional school, in all likeli-
hood, he or she has not been the victim of past de jure discrimination
by that particular component of the educational system. However, as
the Hopwood district court reasoned, "The denial of... opportunities
[for higher education] to [a] generation of minority parents bears a
causal connection to the diminished educational attainment of the
present generation."11 The district court went on to conclude, "The
effects of the State's past de jure segregation in the educational system
are reflected in the low enrollment of minorities in professional
116. Id. at 949-51. Specifically, the court relied on the Wygant Court's rejection of the
provision of minority role models as a compelling government interest on the grounds that
this goal sought to redress "societal discrimination" and that the remedial classification was
not limited to what was necessary to remedy the harm caused by a specific state actor. Id. at
949-50 (citing Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-77 (1986) (plurality opin-
ion)). The Fifth Circuit also relied on the Croson Court's reasoning that "a generalized
assertion that there had been past discrimination in an entire industry provides no gui-
dance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to rem-
edy." Id. at 950 (quoting City of Richmond v. JA_ Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989)
(plurality opinion)).
117. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 571.
118. Id. at 573 (citations omitted). Cf.John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial
Discrimination, 41 U. CH. L. REV. 723, 726 n.22 (1974). Ely suggests a causal connection
between the educational opportunities available to parents and the achievements of their
children.
The real hope lies, I think, in the fact that parents seem to make a difference. If
we underwrite a generation of Black professionals, even a generation that does
not do quite as well in professional school as their White classmates, their chil-
dren and their children's children may grow up with interests, motivations and
aptitudes that are not dissimilar from those the rest of us grew up with, and,
consequently, may do as well in school as Whites from similar backgrounds. The
case for "reparations" or payments for two hundred years of oppression may be an
uneasy one, but those two hundred years cannot but have made a difference.
Id. (citations omitted).
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schools, including the law school."119 The Fifth Circuit erred when it
dismissed this finding and when the court limited the "relevant gov-
ernmental entity" to the law school.1 21
V. CONCLUSION
By eliminating the achievement of a diverse student body as a
compelling justification for affirmative action admissions programs,
the Fifth Circuit sounded the death knell for a justification of dubious
lineage and questionable constitutional viability under the equal pro-
tection principles of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 21 However, the
court dealt a more devastating blow to affirmative action programs in
state institutions of higher learning by limiting these opportunities to
situations in which a particular entity within a state educational system
can demonstrate present effects of its own past discrimination. 122 In a
dissent of the Fifth Circuit's denial of rehearing en banc, seven of the
circuit's judges reflected:
[The Hopwood] opinion goes out of its way to break ground
that the Supreme Court itself has been careful to avoid and
purports to overrule a Supreme Court decision, namely, Re-
gents of the University of California v. Bakke. The radical impli-
cations of this opinion, with its sweeping dicta, will literally
change the face of public educational institutions through-
out Texas, the other states of this circuit, and this nation.1 23
Because the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari in Hop-
wood,1 24 it remains for the Court to determine if strict scrutiny of af-
firmative action programs in educational settings is indeed "'strict in
theory, but fatal in fact."' 1 23
THERESE M. GOLDSMITH
119. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 572.
120. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 949-51.
121. See supra notes 46-53, 100-114 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 115-120 and accompanying text.
123. Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 722 (5th Cir.) (denying rehearing en banc)
(Politz, C.J., King, Wiener, Benavides, Stewart, Parker, and Dennis,JU., dissenting) (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
124. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. at 2581.
125. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995) (quoting Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)).
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